

## Peter G. Troyan

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CONTACT INFORMATION	Department of Economics University of Virginia P.O. Box 400182 Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182	(313) 377-0512 troyan@virginia.edu <a href="http://www.peterstroyan.com">http://www.peterstroyan.com</a>
EDUCATION	Ph.D., Economics Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 2014  B.S., Mathematics (with High Honors) and Physics University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 2008	
ACADEMIC POSITIONS	Associate Professor of Economics, University of Virginia, 2020-present Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Virginia, 2014-2020 Visiting Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, 2019	
RESEARCH INTERESTS	Market Design, Game Theory, Experimental Economics	
PUBLICATIONS	A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design, with Marek Pycia, <i>Econometrica</i> (2023), 91(4):1495-1526 – Best Paper Award at <i>20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)</i> – Exemplary Theory Paper at <i>20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)</i> – Abstract appears in the <i>Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)</i>  Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment, with Andrew Kloosterman, <i>EC '23: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation</i> (2023) (extended abstract)  Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process, with Thayer Morrill, <i>EC '22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation</i> (2022) (extended abstract)  Matching with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance, with Andrew Kloosterman, <i>Theoretical Economics</i> (2020), 15(3):1095-1133  Essentially Stable Matchings, with David Delacrétaz and Andrew Kloosterman, <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> (2020), 120:370-390  Obvious Manipulations, with Thayer Morrill, <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> (2020), 185 – Abstract appears in the <i>Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC19)</i>  Obviously Strategy-Proof Implementation of Top Trading Cycles, <i>International Economic Review</i> (2019), 60(3)  Designing Mechanisms to Focalize Welfare-Improving Strategies, with Daniel Fragiadakis, <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> (2019), 114:232-252  Collusion and Signaling in Auctions with Interdependent Values, <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> (2017), 170:319-345	

- Improving Matching under Hard Distributional Constraints (with Daniel Fragiadakis), *Theoretical Economics* (2017), 12(2):863-908
- Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas (with Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Suguru Ueda, and Makoto Yokoo), *ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation* (2015), 4(1), Article 6
- Comparing School Choice Mechanisms by Interim and Ex-Ante Welfare, *Games and Economic Behavior* (2012), 75(2):936-947
- Strategy-proof Mechanisms for Two-Sided Matching with Minimum and Maximum Quotas (with Suguru Ueda, Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo), *Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems (AAMAS 2012)* (2012), 3:1327-1328 [extended abstract]
- Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics (with Fuhito Kojima), *Japanese Economic Review* (2011), 62:82-98 [refereed survey article]
- WORKING PAPERS Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism, revise and resubmit at *Journal of Mathematical Economics*
- Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment (joint with Andrew Kloosterman), under review
- Abstract to appear in the *Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC23)*
- Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process (joint with Thayer Morrill), under review
- Abstract appears in the *Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22)*
- Strategyproof, Efficient, and Fair Allocation: Beyond Random Priority (joint with Marek Pycia)
- Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms in General Environments (joint with Marek Pycia)
- WORKS IN PROGRESS The Random Priority Mechanism is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair (joint with Marek Pycia)
- INVITED TALKS Georgetown, Penn State, WZB Berlin Matching Workshop, USC, UBC, Zurich, Brown, Princeton, Rochester, Western Ontario, George Mason, Richmond Fed, Washington University in St. Louis, Maryland, Johns Hopkins, Columbia MTI, UCSD, Notre Dame, Villanova (canceled due to COVID), National University of Singapore Workshop on Game Theory, NBER Market Design Workshop, ITAM, NC State, Texas A&M Cal State East Bay, University of Iowa, University of Western Ontario, University of Virginia, University of Illinois
- OTHER CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS EC23 (London), WZB Berlin Matching Workshop, NSF/NBER/CEME Mathematical Economics Conference (Berkeley), ASSA Annual Meeting (Atlanta), MATCH UP 2019 (Ascona), Conference on Economic Design (Budapest), Econometric Society Summer Meetings (Seattle), INFORMS 2019 (Seattle), EC19 (Phoenix), Ottawa Micro Theory Conference, ASSA Annual Meeting (San Diego), Matching in Practice (Cologne), Workshop on Game Theory (National University of Singapore), SAET Conference (Taipei), ESSET 2020 (cancelled due to COVID), Osaka-Rochester Workshop on Alternatives to Market Design, INFORMS Annual Meeting (Houston), Matching in Practice (Brussels), EEA-ESEM (Lisbon), NSF/CEME Decentralization (University of Michigan), MATCH UP 2017 (Microsoft Research Cambridge),

Conference on Economic Design (York), SAET Conference (Faro), NBER Market Design Workshop (Stanford), GAMES 2016 (Maastricht University), Midwest Economic Theory Conference (Ohio State University), MATCH UP 2015 (University of Glasgow), Society for Economic Design (Istanbul Bilgi University), Econometric Society World Congress (Montreal), International Conference on Game Theory (Stony Brook), SAET Conference (University of Queensland), North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society (Northwestern), Southwest Economic Theory Conference (UC San Diego)

SERVICE

Referee for: *Econometrica*, *American Economic Review*, *Journal of Political Economy*, *Review of Economic Studies*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, *Theoretical Economics*, *American Economic Journal: Policy, Games and Economic Behavior*, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, *Economic Theory*, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, *Southern Economic Journal*, *Social Choice and Welfare*, *International Journal of Game Theory*, *Mathematics of Operations Research*, *European Economic Review*, *International Economic Review*, *Management Science*, *European Science Foundation*, *US-Israel Binational Science Foundation*, *American Economic Review: Insights*, *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*, *Journal of Economics Behavior and Organization*, *Operations Research*, *SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics*, Swiss National Science Foundation

Program Committee, EC17, EC20, EC21, EC22

College of Expert Reviewers, European Science Foundation

Co-organizer, University of Virginia Bankard Workshop in Economic Theory and Experimental Economics

GRANTS,  
FELLOWSHIPS AND  
AWARDS

Bankard Fund for Political Economy, 2017, 2019, 2020, 2022

UVA Quantitative Collaborative, 2022

Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences Research Grant, 2022

3Cavs Grant, 2021

A&S Summer Stipend, 2021

Best Paper Award, EC19

Exemplary Theory Paper Award, EC19

Roger Sherman Fellowship, 2019-2020

Haley-Shaw Fellowship, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2013

Graduate Fellowship, Stanford University Department of Economics, 2008

Keeler Scholarship, University of Michigan Department of Mathematics, 2007

Buckfire Scholarship, University of Michigan Honors Program, 2007

Bodine Scholarship, University of Michigan Department of Physics, 2006

Dean's Merit Scholarship, University of Michigan, 2003-2007